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FTA Law in WTO Dispute Settlement:  
Peru-Additional Duty and the Fragmentation of Trade Law 
 
By Gregory Shaffer and L. Alan Winters1 
 
The case Peru-Additional Duty on Imports of Certain Agricultural Products, 
brought by Guatemala, is among the most important cases before the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) in recent years. Mundanely, the case addressed the consistency with 
WTO rules of Peru’s Price Range System (PRS) (Sistema de Franja de Precios) for four 
categories of agricultural products (milk, maize, rice, and sugar), pursuant to which Peru’s 
tariffs could vary fortnightly as a function of historical world prices. More systemically, 
since Peru and Guatemala agreed in a bilateral Free Trade Agreement (FTA) that “Peru 
may maintain its Price Range System,” the Appellate Body decision addressed the 
interaction of WTO law with FTA rules, as well as public international law generally. The 
FTA provided, “in the event of any inconsistency” between WTO rules and FTA rules, the 
FTA rules “shall prevail,” but that is not how the case turned out. The case is important for 
trade policymakers and scholars addressing a world of fragmented international treaties 
and institutions. 
The dispute involved two central issues. The first was whether Peru’s PRS violated 
Article 4.2 of the WTO’s Agreement on Agriculture because it constituted a “variable 
import levy” and thus was an “other duty or charge” in violation of Article II:1(b) of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994. At first glance, this was easy. The 
panel and Appellate Body simply applied the Appellate Body’s earlier jurisprudence in 
Chile-Price Band to a related set of facts. In doing so, it clarified how to approach and 
analyze price range systems under WTO rules.  
The second issue concerned the relation of these WTO rules to the 2011 FTA 
between Peru and Guatemala that arguably permitted Peru’s price range system. It poses 
the question of which rules apply in a defense before the Appellate Body: the Appellate 
Body’s interpretation of WTO rules in clinical isolation of the FTA, or WTO rules in light 
of the parties’ agreement in the FTA? The answer to that question implicates the following 
fundamental institutional question: who decides, a bilateral political process or a 
multilateral judicial one (Shaffer and Trachtman 2011)? The panel avoided this issue 
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because the FTA in question had not been ratified, but the Appellate Body tackled it head 
on, assessing the applicability of the FTA’s rules regardless of its status, raising systemic 
questions of trade governance. After critically assessing the Appellate Body decision, Part 
II sets forth a series of judicial and political choices for addressing the interaction of WTO 
and FTA rules going forward. In particular, it contends that clear modifications of WTO 
commitments under an FTA should be recognized by WTO panels, but subject to the FTA 
itself complying with GATT requirements for FTAs under GATT Article XXIV. 
The relationship between multilateral and bilateral trade rules is becoming ever 
more important. The WTO has become largely dysfunctional as a multilateral negotiating 
forum, but trade negotiations and agreements proliferate in other bilateral and plurilateral 
venues. There is a serious imbalance between the sclerosis of the WTO’s political process 
and the automatic adoption of WTO Appellate Body reports, This imbalance is brought to 
light where the Appellate Body interprets the meaning of ambiguous provisions, and the 
losing party then challenges its authority by accusing it of illegitimate judicial activism and 
“gap filling,” especially when the losing party is a powerful country such as the United 
States. Such a situation could undermine confidence in the WTO, including its so-called 
“crown jewel,” the WTO dispute settlement system, which has been uniquely authoritative 
as an international tribunal at the multilateral level, but whose authority appears to be at 
risk (Shaffer, Elsig and Puig 2016). 
 
 
I. The WTO Legality of Peru’s Agricultural Price Range System  
There are policy trade-offs with agricultural tariff schemes aimed at stabilizing 
prices. On the one hand, as Saggi and Wu (2016) show, under a simple neoclassical 
economic model, stabilising duty-inclusive import prices is harmful in small open 
economies in economic welfare terms. On the other hand, they note that, in more complex 
models with frictions in factor markets, a lack of insurance markets and risk aversion, there 
may be overall welfare benefits, and there will certainly be distributional effects that are 
socially or politically attractive in the medium term. The latter apply particularly to 
agriculture in poorer countries, in which the returns to land are important, production 
decisions have to be taken well in advance of sale, many producers are poor, and food 
absorbs a high share of poor people’s expenditure. The long-run attractions of attempting 
to stabilise prices nonetheless are less clear because, as the world changes, fixed prices get 
further out of line and eventually impose severe economic distortions on an economy.  
While price range systems and variable levies may have domestic attractions, they 
shift the burden of volatility onto other countries and undermine the predictability of the 
import taxes faced by foreign traders. Thus they impose costs abroad, and countries have 
adopted international rules to address them.  
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A. A Brief History of Variable Levies.  
Sampson and Snape (1980) trace variable levies (VLs) back to the early nineteenth 
century in the British Corn Laws and the French echelle mobile of 1819. They slipped into 
modern policy in the guise of minimum import prices in 1935 in a convention between 
Belgium and Luxembourg over Benelux’s trade policy (Tracy, 1989, p. 244) and into the 
Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) of the European Union (E.U.) in the Stresa conference 
of 1958 (Tracy, 1994).2 After the latter, VLs became an iconic part of the CAP, which was 
often viewed as a major achievement for economic integration and a central support for the 
maintenance of peace in Europe. The E.U. consequentially viewed the CAP as 
fundamentally non-negotiable.  
The E.U.’s VLs were designed to achieve a fixed internal price (the so-called 
threshold price), which was fixed annually by policy quite independently of market forces. 
The levy was calculated every day to absorb the difference between the cif (cost, insurance 
and freight) import price measured at Rotterdam and the threshold price (adjusted for 
trading costs); it could be negative if import prices were high. The threshold prices were 
set at high levels; this generated surpluses in the E.U., which were then exported with the 
help of subsidies. Together these policies fixed the internal price of the affected agricultural 
products almost precisely at the threshold level and thus insulated European producers and 
consumers from any need to adjust to market shocks at all. This, in turn, shifted the whole 
burden of adjustment onto other countries. Agricultural producers in the rest of the world 
thus saw their agricultural markets eroded and their prices become more volatile. Led by 
the U.S. they targeted E.U. policy, including the VLs, very strongly in disputes and the 
trade negotiations undertaken under the auspices of the GATT.3  
In the Uruguay Round, the U.S. aimed to eliminate agricultural protection, and from 
an early date pressed the case for ‘tariffying’ all trade barriers other than ordinary customs 
duties - i.e. converting them into tariffs of the same protective effect - and then gradually 
reducing those tariffs to zero. The Round nearly came to grief several times over agriculture, 
but at the last moment agreement was reached, including to tariffy non-tariff barriers and 
then reduce (but not eliminate) the tariff rates.4   
This agreement was incorporated into the Agreement on Agriculture, Article 4.2 of 
which prohibited “…measures of the kind which have been required to be converted into 
ordinary customs duties…” with its ostensibly clarificatory footnote that these “include … 
variable import levies, minimum import prices, … and similar border measures….”. For 
our purposes, two aspects of the agreement are of note. First, the degree of tariff 
liberalisation achieved was actually rather small and as early as 1995, commentators were 
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claiming that the Round’s main achievement in agriculture was not that it had reduced trade 
barriers but that the system had been rationalised and that through tariffication the means 
to future liberalisation had been secured (Hathaway and Ingco 1995, p. 58). If this was all 
that seven years’ hard politicking had produced, it is easy to see why trade officials from 
the WTO and the agricultural exporting nations became so wedded to the principle of 
tariffication and the elimination of variable levy and minimum import price schemes.  
The second aspect of note is that, as we discuss below, Article 4.2 is ambiguous 
because ‘of the kind’ is not precise and the footnote is only illustrative (it says ‘include’). 
However, one can arguably see the intent of the negotiations because the staff document 
issued immediately after the Agreement was signed to guide its implementation – the so-
called ‘Modalities’, (MTN.GNG/MA/W/24) – states in Annex III, Section A, paragraph 1: 
 
“The policy coverage of tariffication shall include all border measures other 
than ordinary customs duties such as:  quantitative import restrictions, 
variable import levies, minimum import prices, … and any other schemes 
similar to those listed above ….” (emphasis added) 
 
Although the Modalities state that they “shall not be used as a basis for dispute settlement 
proceedings” (p. 1), the text makes clear the expectation that everything other than 
“ordinary customs duties” was liable to tariffication.  
These elements of the Agreement on Agriculture were clearly aimed at the E.U., 
which is large enough to impose material costs on its trading partners via both the terms-
of-trade effects of protection and the transmission of instability. In contrast, if a small 
country such as Peru were guilty of such behaviour, its effect on the rest of the world would 
be correspondingly small and therefore may not be worth contesting. However, first, even 
a small economy may be large to one of its neighbours if the latter depends heavily on it 
for trade. Second, if every small country behaved in this way, the effects would add up to 
something significant. Third, even violations by insignificant players can undermine the 
credibility of the system and thus increase the chances that larger players will transgress. 
Peru fits this situation – it is not large enough to impose serious costs on the vast majority 
of trading nations - but given the almost iconic status of VLs in the struggle to create the 
WTO it might be felt that to allow one to pass unchallenged was a step too far.  
 
B. Peru’s Price Range System.  
 
Peru’s PRS covers 45 agricultural products, separated into four general categories: milk, 
yellow maize, rice, and sugar.5 Within each category, one tariff line is designated a “marker” 
                                                                    
5
 For a complete list at the HS-10 level, see Panel Report, para. 7.121. This analysis concerns only the ‘marker’ 
products, but SW16 consider the other products briefly. 
  5 
product and all others as “associated” products. Floor and ceiling prices are determined for 
each marker product on the basis of the monthly average f.o.b. (freight on board) prices for 
the past 60 months on the international reference market for that marker product corrected 
for U.S. inflation. These prices are updated semi-annually and converted into c.i.f. floor 
and ceiling prices.6 In addition, a reference price for the marker product is calculated every 
two weeks as the average international market price for the product over the preceding two 
weeks, also converted to c.i.f terms.7 
Whenever the international reference price, pR falls below the floor price, ��, a variable 
additional duty is levied on the imported good to bring its price up to the floor level.  Letting 
b denote an allowance for the import costs associated with marker products, the additional 
variable duty �� is given by: �� =  ሺ1 +  �ሻ ሺ��– ��ሻ    (1) 
This prevents low import prices from being passed onto Peruvian farmers and consumers. 
When, on the other hand, the reference price is above the ceiling price, ��, a tariff rebate 
is issued to the importer to bring the net price down to the ceiling level.  It equals: �� =  ሺ1 +  �ሻ ሺ�� −  ��ሻ    (2) 
This serves to protect Peruvian consumers from undesired price increases on the global 
market.  
The declared objectives of Peru’s PRS are to foster price stability by “neutraliz[ing] 
the fluctuations of international prices,” and to counter the adverse effects of price 
distortions in international markets and improve domestic competitiveness, which amount 
to providing an element of protection to farmers.8 Our first question, therefore, is: did the 
actual design of Peru’s PRS achieve its stated objectives?  
Even for the marker products, the PRS’s stabilisation is incomplete and its 
protection somewhat covert and arbitrary. The system is anchored to the long-run mean 
world price of the marker products from which we infer that the long-run price is in some 
sense an objective and hence an appropriate bench-mark against which to measure the 
PRS’s performance. A price-band scheme aimed purely at stabilisation would allow prices 
to vary within a band around the mean price (μ), with more extreme fluctuations in either 
direction curtailed according to equations (1) and (2) above. The band in the PRS is set 
equal to the standard deviation of world prices measured over the five year anchor period 
(s), but instead of spanning the mean price such that the range is (μ – s/2) to (μ + s/2), it 
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rests on the mean price, giving a range of μ to (μ + s). This design feature prevents local 
prices from falling below the long-run world mean and results in the mean duty-inclusive 
import price being approximately s/2 above the mean long-run world price μ.9 The value 
of s clearly depends on the variability of the reference prices over the preceding five years; 
over our sample of data – see SW16 – s/2 ranges from 3.7% of the long-run world mean 
price (for dairy products over early 2002) to 23.6% (for rice in 2010). 
The Peruvian PRS has two other modifications relative to a simple price band. First, as 
noted above, the additional duty under the PRS was capped so that the sum of the additional 
duty, the ad valorem tariff (of 0% after 2010), and (while it lasted) an import surcharge did 
not exceed the ad valorem rates bound under the Uruguay Round. Peru’s bound rates for 
the four marker products were high — 68% for all four categories from 2004 onwards — 
so that this constraint virtually never bound. The second modification is that when prices 
exceed the ceiling price, Peru caps the rebate it provides importers to the total level of 
duties (ad valorem and surcharge) they paid. Because Peru’s applied rates were low 
(eventually zero), this restriction constrains the PRS’s ability to mitigate the transmission 
of high world prices and thus imparts a significant upward bias to the average duty-
inclusive import price. That is, the PRS serves to increase Peru’s average duty-inclusive 
prices.  
In SW16 we calculate the effects of the PRS on the average level of protection and 
duty-inclusive price-stability for each of the marker products. If the Peruvian authorities 
were truly aiming to replicate the (long-run) world average prices and to reduce variability 
about them, a centered PRS would do this quite effectively. However, by grossing up the 
sugar price, rebasing the PRS to rest on the mean and by limiting rebates to the duties paid, 
the PRS created a substantial positive bias to mean prices. In three out of the four products, 
the mean price induced by the actual PRS exceeds that of the reference price and for none 
of them was variability reduced by more than a quarter. Thus, as it turned out, the PRS 
functioned generally to protect farmers from low world prices while allowing them to 
benefit from high world prices. Figure 1 plots the reference and the PRS-adjusted prices 
for the four products.  
The objective of protecting farmers’ incomes is particularly salient for sugar, which 
is the only PRS commodity for which, according to Saggi and Wu (2016), Guatemala 
exported significant amounts to Peru. When the FTA negotiations between Guatemala and 
Peru were initiated in October 2010 and signed in December 2011, Peru was levying no 
additional duty. But by April 2013, when Guatemala sought WTO consultations about the 
PRS, prices had fallen and the additional duty had risen to about 25%, and it had reached 
30% by September 2013, when the panel was formed. This price change arguably explains 
why Peru brought the WTO complaint following its signature of the 2011 FTA. 
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Figure 1: Reference Prices and Post-PRS prices: four marker products 
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 C. The Appellate Body Decision on Guatemala’s PRS Claims. 
The first group of WTO legal questions in the case were three-fold: (i) whether 
Peru’s PRS gave rise to variable import levies (or measures similar to them) in violation of 
Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture; (ii) whether the PRS involved minimum 
import prices (or measures similar to them) in violation of that same article; and (iii) 
whether the PRS gave rise to duties that were not “ordinary customs duties,” but rather 
“other duties or charges” not listed on Peru’s tariff schedule, in violation of Article II:1(b) 
of GATT 1994.  
The panel and the Appellate Body first analyzed the claims under Article 4.2 of the 
Agreement on Agriculture because these provisions were more specific (and thus lex 
specialis) in governing the agricultural tariff scheme. From the text of Article 4.2 – given 
above - the key question was whether Peru’s measures were “of the kind which have been 
required to be converted into ordinary customs duties.” Since the term “ordinary customs 
duties” is not defined, and since the agreement does not specify what “kind” of measures 
were required to be converted other than the non-exclusive list contained in the footnote, 
the text is not without ambiguity.10 The panel and Appellate Body thus focused on whether 
Peru’s scheme was a “variable import levy” or a “minimum import price,” or a measure 
“similar” to one, which terms are not defined.  
This legal issue was straightforward in light of the Appellate Body’s analysis in its 
2003 decision in Chile-Price Band regarding the meaning of these terms. In that case, the 
Appellate Body found that Chile’s price band was sufficiently similar to a variable import 
levy and a minimum import price so as to contravene Article 4.2 of the Agreement on 
Agriculture. The panel and Appellate Body both repeatedly cited the Chile-Price Band 
precedent to find that the duties were “variable.” This finding raises the question posed by 
Saggi and Wu (2016) in their analysis of the panel decision in Peru-Additional Duty as to 
whether a PRS can be designed to vary less frequently (say once a month, or once every 
six months) so that it could pass muster under the Appellate Body’s analysis.11  
Once the panel and Appellate Body found that the PRS gave rise to a variable 
import levy, they easily concluded that the PRS was not an “ordinary customs duty” within 
the meaning of GATT Article II.1(b). The determination of the Article 4.2 claim under the 
Agreement on Agriculture, in other words, effectively determined the GATT Article 
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II(1)(b) claim because the footnote to Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture notes 
“variable import levies” and “minimum import prices” as examples of measures that are 
not “ordinary customs duties.”12 As a result, both the panel and the Appellate Body found 
that the tariff measures were “other duties and charges” that Peru had not listed in its 
schedule, so that Peru also violated GATT Article II.1(b).  
 There may be good legal grounds to maintain that the design, structure, and 
operation of Peru’s measures are similar to a variable import levy and (possibly) a 
minimum import price. Yet, given that there is some ambiguity regarding the definition of 
a variable import levy, given that Peru’s applied tariffs were set at zero so long as the 
reference price fell above the floor price, given that Peru was authorized to raise its tariffs 
to 68% (WTO tariff binding), and given that Peruvian policy makers see a rationale for a 
PRS to provide some stability to agricultural markets for farmers, especially poorer ones 
who otherwise may be unable to tap into insurance markets, it seems worth seeking a 
solution. The current situation places stains on the system which, if not resolved through 
an acceptable dispute outcome or through a mutually agreed settlement, could lead to a 
Member either raising its applied tariff in a blunt way to block imports (possibly up to its 
tariff binding), or defying the Appellate Body. The third alternative, which is an 
interpretation of what happened here, is that the Member may negotiate a political 
agreement, such as through a series of FTAs, and ask the Appellate Body to recognize 
those agreements. 
The WTO legal dispute in Chile-Price Band on this issue lasted seven years, from 
October 5, 2000 when Argentina first filed its complaint, until May 7, 2007 when the 
Appellate Body issued its Article 21.5 ruling that Chile had still not complied with the 
Appellate Body ruling of September 23, 2002. Chile continues to use a price band subject 
to its WTO tariff binding, a binding that it renegotiated to increase to 98% for sugar after 
the WTO ruling. There was, in other words, lots of law, but little action. In the end, the 
panel and Appellate Body reports had little legal effect, and the two sides moved on.  
A similar pattern appears to be developing in response to the Appellate Body 
decision in Peru-Additional Duty. Following the decision, an arbitrator, Ricardo Ramirez, 
decided that Peru should comply with the decision by March 29, 2016. Peru maintained its 
PRS, but with reference prices that will now by published monthly.13 In this way, Peru 
aims to advance an argument that the PRS is no longer a “variable import levy” (since it 
only changes monthly), and thus an ordinary customs duty with an applied rate that is less 
than Peru’s tariff binding. Guatemala may commence an Article 21.5 compliance 
proceeding that will drag the case through more legal hoops.  
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The question posed before the Article 21.5 compliance panel will be where to draw 
the line between an “ordinary customs duty,” which countries can periodically change 
provided the duty remains beneath the tariff binding, and an “other duty or charge” in the 
form of a variable import levy which is prohibited. The answer is not obvious, especially 
if the stated goal of the Agreement on Agriculture is to provide greater predictability for 
traders. If Peru replaces its PRS with a system of periodically changing its ordinary customs 
duty through an administrative decision, the changes would be less predictable for traders. 
At the end of the day, the Appellate Body’s legal ruling, as that in Chile-Price Band, may 
be largely ignored or its effect undercut through other means, such as through a general 
safeguard measure, or by periodically raising the applied tariff rate. The political salience 
for Peru appears simply too great, as reflected in Peru’s efforts to sign FTAs with its major 
trading partners regarding the PRS. 
 
 II. Peru’s Defense: Relation of the FTA to WTO Rules in a WTO Dispute 
The ability to use a PRS for this set of products (milk, maize, rice, and sugar) is 
politically salient for Peru. Between 2005-2015, Peru signed at least fifteen FTAs covering 
at least fifty WTO members: Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, the EFTA states, the European Union (and its member states), Guatemala, Honduras, 
Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, South Korea, Mexico, Panama, Singapore, Vietnam, and 
the United States, in which these WTO members accepted Peru’s PRS. Peru negotiated 
such acceptance under the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) mega-regional, and thus 
including with the U.S. in the event the U.S. ratifies the TPP (for FTA texts, see Annex 1, 
Saggi and Wu 2016).14 The WTO Appellate Body may have found that Peru’s PRS was 
unacceptable under WTO rules; but Peru negotiated specific rules accepting the PRS with 
its most important trading partners. 
In the case of the Peru-Guatemala FTA, Guatemala agreed that “Peru may maintain 
its Price Range System established in Decree no. 1152001EF.” Although, in the first 
paragraph of FTA Article 1.3, the parties “confirm their existing mutual rights and 
obligations under the WTO Agreement and other agreements to which they may be parties,” 
the second paragraph clarifies that, “[i]n the event of any inconsistency between this Treaty 
and the agreements referred to in paragraph 1 [such as the WTO Agreement], this Treaty 
shall prevail to the extent of the inconsistency, unless otherwise provided in this Treaty.”  
The critical question is: what is the relation of FTA provisions as a defense to WTO 
rules? In public international law, in the event of a conflict between provisions in two 
agreements, two canons of interpretation help resolve it. One is the rule of lex posterior, 
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codified in Article 30(3) and (4) of the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties (Vienna 
Convention), which provides that a later-in-time rule prevails over the earlier one. The 
other is the principle of lex specialis, cited in WTO jurisprudence, which provides that 
where two sets of laws govern the same factual situation, the more specific law overrides 
the more general one. Where one rule is a multilateral rule and the other a bilateral rule, 
Article 41 of the Vienna Convention further provides that two parties may modify a 
multilateral treaty between themselves, under certain conditions, reflecting the lex 
posterior rule. These rules are grounded in the principle of the contractual freedom of states 
to specify and modify the rights and obligations existing between them.  
 The FTA provision permitting Peru’s PRS, however, was clearly inconsistent with 
the Appellate Body’s former interpretation of applicable WTO rules. The existence of such 
inconsistency raises a series of questions that the Appellate Body could address more 
clearly. First, what is the applicable law before the WTO once a WTO tribunal is seized 
with a WTO complaint: only the WTO “covered agreements” or the WTO agreements in 
light of other international law? Second, if a WTO tribunal may refer to other international 
law (such as another international treaty) as a defense (whether as a waiver of the right to 
bring a WTO claim or as a modification of the rules applicable between the parties), was 
there a conflict between the FTA rules and WTO rules, such that conflict-of-laws rules 
apply? Third, if conflict-of-laws rules apply, what was the parties’ intent under the FTA in 
the event of an inconsistency or conflict with WTO rules? Fourth, if a WTO dispute 
settlement panel is to recognize a defense under an FTA, must the FTA itself comply with 
WTO requirements? 
 
A. Peru’s Possible Defenses.  
We commence this section with a brief overview of four primary ways Peru could 
raise a defense to Guatemala’s WTO complaint in relation to the FTA, had the FTA been 
in effect, because the Appellate Body interpreted the relation of WTO rules regardless of 
the FTA’s legal status.15 First, Peru could maintain that Guatemala had expressly waived 
its rights under the FTA to bring a WTO complaint against the PRS. Second, as a variant 
of the waiver defense, Peru could argue that Guatemala had expressly consented to the 
PRS, precluding a finding of wrongfulness under customary international law. Third, Peru 
could contend that, under customary rules of interpretation, WTO rules should be 
interpreted between FTA parties in light of the FTA. Fourth, Peru could maintain that the 
FTA modified WTO rules as between the FTA parties, and such modification should be 
recognized as a defense to the WTO complaint. Note that all these defenses serve to prevent 
or otherwise defend only against Guatemala bringing a WTO claim, not to justify the PRS 
so far as it applied to any other WTO Members. 
                                                                    
15
 The Appellate Body noted that Peru had yet to ratify the FTA, and thus it is not clear that Peru is a “party” 
to the FTA. Yet, the Appellate Body stressed that its findings were “irrespective of the status of the FTA as 
not being ratified by both parties.” AB Report, paras. 5.106, and para. 5.28. 
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On the first defense, the WTO Agreement has a provision on waivers (Article X), 
but this provision governs waivers granted by all WTO Members, not the waiver by one 
Member in an inter se agreement with another Member. The Appellate Body has 
recognized the ability of a Member to waive a claim in relation to a mutually agreed 
solution to a WTO complaint in the EC-Bananas 21.5 (US) case (2008). The question 
arises whether a WTO Member can also agree to a waiver outside of a mutually agreed 
solution to a specific WTO complaint. In this respect, Article 45 of the International Law 
Commission’s Articles on Responsibility of States (ILC Articles) provides that “the 
responsibility of a State may not be invoked if… the injured State has validly waived the 
claim.”  
On the second defense, which is a variant of the first, Article 20 of the ILC Articles 
provides that “valid consent by a State to the commission of a given act by another State 
precludes the wrongfulness of that act in relation to the former State.” Consent is “a basic 
international law principle” that can be raised as a defense.16 It does not involve a change 
in substantive obligations (such as the modification of rights and obligations), but rather 
recognition that a state can consent to an action or measure otherwise in contravention of 
an international legal obligation, and that when it does, it cannot then claim responsibility 
from the other state. Article 20, however, would not apply if the WTO Agreement 
precludes the giving of bilateral consent to a WTO-inconsistent measure, and rather 
requires a waiver granted by all WTO Members in compliance with Article X of the WTO 
Agreement. Alternatively, a WTO panel might not permit such a defense if the FTA 
containing the consent itself is in violation of GATT Article XXIV requirements. 
On the third defense, Article 3.2 of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding 
(DSU) provides that the WTO agreements are to be interpreted “in accordance with 
customary rules of interpretation of international law.” Such customary rules provide 
means for interpreting WTO provisions, including in light of other international law. 
However, such other international law should be relevant to the interpretation of the WTO 
provisions in question, and it cannot modify their terms, but only help clarify their meaning. 
Moreover, such interpretations will apply to all WTO Members, and not just to the parties 
to a dispute.  
On the fourth defense, Article 41 of the Vienna Convention permits parties to 
modify a multilateral treaty inter se so long as the following conditions apply: 
 
(i) “the modification in question is not prohibited by the treaty”; 
(ii) the modification “does not affect the enjoyment by the other parties of their 
rights under the treaty”; 
(iii) the modification “does not relate to a provision, derogation from which is 
incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty as a whole.” 
 
                                                                    
16
 ILC Articles, Article 20, Commentary, par. 1, p. 72. 
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The question is whether all of these conditions apply. The WTO treaties do not (at least 
expressly) prohibit inter se modifications. The modification arguably does not affect the 
de facto enjoyment of other WTO parties of their rights, and neither is it incompatible with 
the object and purpose of the WTO treaties as a whole.17  
Many scholars nonetheless argue that WTO panels and the Appellate Body are 
limited to interpreting the WTO “covered agreements,” which are lex specialis, so that only 
provisions of the WTO agreements, as interpreted in accordance with customary 
international law, can be used as a defense to a WTO complaint (Trachtman 2001; Marceau 
2001). These scholars cite various provisions of the DSU for support, such as DSU Article 
3.2, which provides that the DSU “serves to preserve the rights and obligations of Members 
under the covered agreements,” and DSU Article 19.2, which provides that panel and 
Appellate Body rulings “cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in 
the covered agreements” (emphasis added). Bartels (2001) maintains that these provisions 
constitute an implicit conflicts rule, and provide that WTO texts prevail in the event of a 
conflict.  
Alternatively, however, these provisions can be viewed as statements against 
judicial activism in the interpretation of WTO legal texts, while saying nothing about 
contracting out of conventional public international law conflicts rules, especially since 
they contain no conflicts language within them. None of these WTO provisions, for 
example, is like Article 103 of the UN Charter that provides, in the event of a conflict with 
any other international agreement, the “obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.” 
Thus, other scholars stress that the WTO is an international treaty and, as such, is part of 
public international law (Pauwelyn 2003a; 2003b). They contend that, although WTO 
panels only have jurisdiction to hear complaints under WTO law, the WTO agreements do 
not provide that WTO Members have contracted out of defenses that they otherwise have 
under public international law, including under other treaties pursuant to Article 41 of the 
Vienna Convention and Article 20 of the ILC Articles.  
 To the extent that one accepts that other international law may apply as a defense, 
one must then assess whether there is a conflict between the two treaties. Some scholars 
maintain a narrow definition of a “conflict,” one in which a conflict occurs only if it is 
impossible to comply with both treaties simultaneously. Under such view of a “conflict,” 
obligations always prevail over permissions. Since the FTA provision is permissive and 
not obligatory, there would thus be no conflict. We find (with Pauwelyn, 2003a) that such 
a narrow definition of conflict would fail to recognize the intent of the parties, thereby 
curtailing Members’ policy space against their express agreement.  
 
B. FTA Defenses Raised by Peru; the Panel and Appellate Body Rulings. 
                                                                    
17 The PRS, to the extent that it is applied to all WTO Members, affects other WTO Members rights in 
principle because it shifts volatility onto them, but taken in isolation Peru is small enough that these effects 
are probably negligible in practice. 
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Peru’s failure to ratify the FTA constrained the defenses it could raise, and so Peru 
attempted to base its defense largely on WTO texts. Peru argued before the panel that 
Guatemala had failed to act in “good faith” in bringing its complaint, which violated 
Guatemala’s obligations under Articles 3.7 and 3.10 of the DSU.18 Because the FTA was 
not in force, Peru cited Article 18 of the Vienna Convention which provides that “[a] State 
is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty” that 
it has signed and that is in the process of ratification. As an alternative argument, Peru 
maintained that the FTA had modified Guatemala’s rights under the WTO framework by 
maintaining that Peru could maintain its PRS, but this was a weak argument because the 
FTA was not in effect. 
In response, the panel grounded its analysis on the fact that the FTA was not in 
force, and that a “treaty only begins to produce legal effects and bind the parties from the 
moment it enters into force.”19  Since the treaty was not in effect, it created no legal 
obligations on Guatemala. On the issue of modification, the panel ruled: “[i]n light of this 
fact [that the treaty was not ratified], it is not necessary for this Panel to express an opinion 
on whether the parties may, through the FTA, modify between themselves their rights and 
obligations under the covered agreements, or whether there is a conflict of rules between 
the FTA and the covered agreements….”20  
In its appeal, Peru expanded its defense to contend that Guatemala had waived its 
rights to bring a WTO complaint against Peru’s PRS after Guatemala accepted the PRS in 
the FTA. Peru bolstered this defense by citing Articles 20 and 45 of the ILC’s Articles on 
Responsibility of States. Peru, however, no longer maintained that the FTA had modified 
its WTO obligations, but rather contended that the WTO provisions should be interpreted 
in light of the FTA. The Appellate Body, since its creation, has recognized that WTO rules 
are to be interpreted in light of the customary rules set forth in Articles 31 and 32 of the 
Vienna Convention. Article 31(3) provides that the that the interpreter will take into 
account “[a]ny subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of 
the treaty or the application of its provisions… and [a]ny relevant rules of international 
law applicable in the relations between the parties” (emphasis added). Peru maintained 
that the FTA was a “subsequent agreement between the parties” to the dispute, and that 
ILC Articles 20 and 45 were “relevant rules of international law” for the interpretation of 
the covered agreements.  
In response to the good faith and waiver defenses, the Appellate Body found that 
Guatemala had “not clearly waived its right to recourse” to the DSU. Importantly, the 
                                                                    
18
 DSU Article 3.7, in relevant part, provides “Before bringing a case, a Member shall exercise its judgement 
as to whether action under these procedures would be fruitful.” DSU Article 3.10 provides, in relevant part, 
“It is understood that requests for conciliation and the use of the dispute settlement procedures should not be 
intended or considered as contentious acts and that, if a dispute arises, all Members will engage in these 
procedures in good faith in an effort to resolve the dispute.” 
19
 Panel Report, Para. 7.88.  
20
 Panel Report, Para. 7.528 
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Appellate Body did “not exclude the possibility of articulating the relinquishing of the right 
to initiate WTO dispute settlement proceedings in a form other than a waiver embodied in 
a mutually agreed solution [to a WTO dispute].”21 Nonetheless, it stressed a series of 
conditions for it to recognize such a waiver. First, “any such relinquishment must be made 
clearly” (emphasis added).22 Second, such relinquishment “should be ascertained… in 
relation to, or within the context of, the rules and procedures of the DSU.”23 Third, the 
relinquishment may not go “beyond the settlement of specific disputes.”24 Fourth, the 
Appellate Body warned that “the DSU emphasizes that ‘[a] solution mutually acceptable 
to the parties’ must be “consistent with the covered agreements” (emphasis added).25  
These conditions will need to be clarified, but appear to go beyond WTO textual 
requirements. For example, why must a waiver apply to a specific dispute rather than a 
general obligation, so long as no other WTO party is harmed? 26  Moreover, the last 
condition suggests that WTO Members can never waive their rights to bring a WTO 
complaint regarding a WTO-inconsistent provision. But what else is a waiver except 
permission for a party to engage in conduct that otherwise would be inconsistent with its 
obligations? Moreover, the provision it cites, DSU Article 3.7, only provides that a solution 
“consistent with the covered agreements is clearly to be preferred,” not that it is required. 
Parties should be able to consent among themselves to measures that the Appellate Body 
would otherwise find violate WTO rules, provided other WTO Members are not adversely 
affected, as reflected in Article 20 of the ILC Articles. The Appellate Body’s dicta is thus 
problematic to the extent it calls on panels to ignore parties’ clearly expressed intent. 
To support its conclusion, the Appellate Body found that it was ambiguous in this 
case whether Guatemala consented to modify WTO rules with Peru, and thus waive its 
WTO rights, especially since FTA Article 1.3 confirms the FTA parties’ WTO rights.27 
The Appellate Body thus saw “no reason to address further Peru’s arguments that ILC 
Articles 20 and 45 provide additional support for its [waiver] argument,” or Peru’s 
arguments regarding Article 18 of the Vienna Convention.28 The Appellate Body’s position, 
however, is counterbalanced by the fact that the FTA expressly provides that “Peru may 
maintain its Price Range System established in Decree no. 1152001EF,” and that the FTA 
contains a clear conflicts clause which provides: “In the event of any inconsistency between 
this Treaty and the agreements referred to in paragraph 1 [the WTO agreements], this 
Treaty shall prevail to the extent of the inconsistency, unless otherwise provided in this 
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 AB Report, para. 5.25 
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 AB Report, para 5.25.  
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 Id.. 
24
 Id., fn. 106. 
25
 Id.  
26
 It is unclear what the Appellate Body means by a specific dispute. It could refer narrowly to a WTO 
complaint, or it could refer broadly to a general measure that is subsequently litigated under the DSU. 
27
 See AB Report, paras.s 5.26-5.28. See also paras. 5.110-5.111. 
28
 AB Report, para. 5.28, fn. 109. 
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Treaty” (emphasis added).  
 On the issue of interpretation, the Appellate Body found that WTO rules could not 
be interpreted to permit the PRS in light of the FTA because to do so would manifestly 
contradict the WTO’s text, as previously interpreted by the Appellate Body. As the 
Appellate Body noted, it would have to interpret the terms “shall not maintain” in Article 
4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture as “may maintain” in light of the FTA. 29  The 
Appellate Body rightly stressed that Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention provides that 
the “treaty shall be interpreted” as a whole, and “not the treaty as it may apply between 
some of its parties.”30 The Appellate Body correctly found that a WTO provision should 
not have different meanings for different WTO Members.  
 Although Peru focused its defense before the Appellate Body on the “interpretation” 
of WTO provisions, the Appellate Body rightly noted that Peru implicitly argued that the 
FTA had “modified” its obligations toward Guatemala.31 In dicta, the Appellate Body then 
addressed under what conditions it would recognize such modification. It strongly 
suggested, “assuming arguendo that the provision of the FTA allowed Peru to maintain a 
WTO-inconsistent PRS,” that Peru could not modify its WTO commitments through the 
FTA.32  The Appellate Body noted that the WTO contains its own provisions for the 
amendment of WTO rules (Article X of the WTO Agreement) and for their interpretation 
by the membership (Article IX), as well as rules for the creation of an FTA that might be 
used as a defense to a WTO complaint (Article XXIV of GATT 1994).33 The Appellate 
Body suggested that these provisions exclusively cover the modification of WTO rules, so 
that “we are not convinced” that Article 41 of the Vienna Convention applies. 34  It 
suggested, in other words, that WTO Members had contracted out of Article 41 of the 
Vienna Convention through the WTO’s own rules on amendments and exceptions.  
Regarding the application of the GATT Article XXIV exception for FTAs, the 
Appellate Body noted two conditions for raising a defense under an FTA, citing its earlier 
decision in Turkey-Textiles (1999): (i) that the measure at issue is introduced upon 
formation of the FTA that meets Article XXIV requirements; and (ii) that the FTA would 
have been prevented were the party not permitted to introduce the measure.35 Neither of 
these two conditions would have been met because Peru’s PRS preceded the FTA and 
arguably was not necessary for the FTA (although Peru certainly suggested that it was 
important given its refusal to ratify the agreement after Guatemala commenced the WTO 
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 Id., Para 5.94 
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 Id., para. 5.95. The Appellate Body also disagreed with Peru that ILC Articles 20 (regarding valid consent) 
and 45 (regarding valid waiver) are “relevant” rules of international law within the meaning of Article 
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 AB Report, paras. 5.96-5.97. 
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dispute). Moreover, the Appellate Body stressed that the GATT’s FTA exception is to 
facilitate trade and closer integration, and not to provide “a broad defense for measures in 
FTAs that roll back on Members’ rights and obligations under the WTO agreements.”36  
This Appellate Body dicta again problematically refuses to recognize WTO 
Members’ contractual freedom to update and modify the rules that apply between them 
through FTAs, such as to preserve policy space for the stabilization of agricultural prices. 
We contend that the WTO Appellate Body was wrong in suggesting that WTO law 
forecloses the use of all inter se modifications, especially the provisions that the Appellate 
Body cited — Article X of the WTO Agreement and GATT Article XXIV. First, Article 
X of the WTO Agreement provides procedures where amendments apply to all WTO 
Members, but it does not contract out of Article 41 of the Vienna Convention regarding 
inter se modifications between WTO Members that meet Article 41’s conditions. Second, 
GATT Article XXIV provides an exception to WTO most-favored-nation (MFN) rules 
where a party forms an FTA or a customs union that meets specified conditions. But it does 
not contract away parties’ contractual freedom to modify WTO provisions inter se so long 
as the FTA meets those conditions. GATT Article XXIV is about inter se trade 
liberalization as a condition for a deviation from MFN treatment; it is not about inter se 
consent to a non-MFN related measure that does not adversely affect other WTO Members 
(i.e. outside the object of the GATT Article XXIV exception clause). Moreover, GATT 
Article XXIV is an exception to a GATT obligation, and not to the WTO Agreement on 
Agriculture, which was at the center of the dispute. 
It seems wrong to insist that the WTO Members in 1994 foreclosed themselves 
from ever entering into inter se modifications of WTO rules that could be recognized as a 
defense to a WTO complaint between themselves for the rest of time, unless the entire 
WTO membership agrees (in practice by consensus) to amend the WTO agreements.  
 
C. What Can Be Done: Three Judicial and Three Political Options.  
Given changes in global trade and Member preferences since the WTO agreements’ 
conclusion in 1994, and given that the WTO political mechanism is blocked so that rules, 
interpretations, and understandings are not being updated or clarified through the WTO’s 
political processes, it is important to find appropriate ways for WTO Members to define 
their trade relations through a political mechanism. This is particularly the case given 
complaints by some WTO members and commentators that the Appellate Body has 
engaged in judicial activism and “gap-filling” in interpreting WTO rules. To the extent that 
the WTO text itself is ambiguous, as Bagwell and Sykes (2004) wrote regarding the 
Appellate Body’s earlier Chile-Price Band decision), there is an even more demanding 
case that the Appellate Body should defer to Members that clarify, through a political 
mechanism, their understanding of the rules that apply between them. Even if the WTO 
rules are patently clear, if the WTO political process is blocked, Members should be able 
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to negotiate the rules that apply between them outside of the WTO, as recognized under 
public international law.  
So what can be done? There are a number of options that can be pursued, judicially 
and politically. Judicially, the Appellate Body can fend off the application of FTA rules or 
find ways to facilitate greater coherence between WTO and FTA rules. Politically, WTO 
Members can take different initiatives that vary in their ambition. 
 
1. Three Judicial Options. A first judicial option, reflected in the Appellate Body’s 
ruling, is to prohibit defenses under FTAs other than express waivers of the right to bring 
a WTO complaint. Under this scenario, WTO rules exist in parallel to FTAs, but FTA rules 
cannot be invoked before the WTO dispute settlement system as a defense unless there is 
an express waiver of a WTO right. The Appellate Body left the door ajar for a Member to 
expressly waive the right to bring a WTO claim through an FTA so long as the waiver is 
clear. 37  Peru thus might have prevailed had the parties added a sentence such as 
“Guatemala consents to the PRS and waives any rights it may have to challenge the PRS 
under WTO rules.” But this position does not make it easy for negotiators of FTAs since it 
is impossible to know in advance how a measure such as the PRS will be applied, and the 
WTO dispute settlement system is more effective than FTA dispute settlement mechanisms. 
Such a position will constrain the utility of negotiating exceptions under an FTA to enhance 
policy space, such as Peru’s PRS. 
A second judicial option would be for the Appellate Body to reverse course and 
apply conflict rules under international law, such as Article 41 of the Vienna Convention, 
since the WTO Agreement does not expressly prohibit inter se modifications of WTO rules, 
and parties should be granted the contractual freedom to update the trade rules that apply 
between them. The WTO Appellate Body could likewise recognize that FTA rules 
constitute “consent” to a measure that would otherwise violate WTO obligations, and thus 
preclude a finding of wrongful conduct (per Article 20 of the ILC Articles), provided (i) 
that the consent is sufficiently clear and (ii) that other WTO Members are not adversely 
affected by it.  
A third judicial option, which we advance, is to permit a defense under an FTA so 
long as the respondent proves that the FTA meets the two core requirements under GATT 
Article XXIV regarding FTAs, namely (i) liberalization of “substantially all trade” among 
FTA members; and (ii) not raising trade restrictions against other WTO Members.38 The 
additional conditions that the Appellate Body cited from its earlier Appellate Body decision 
in Turkey-Textiles (1999) should not be relevant (such as necessity for the creation of an 
FTA) since those conditions come from the preamble of paragraph 5 of Article XXIV 
concerning the raising of a defense against a MFN-violation. Unlike Turkey, Peru was not 
raising new trade restrictions against a non-FTA party in violation of the MFN clause, but 
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rather only against an FTA party, and with that party’s express consent. Under this third 
option, defenses could be raised under an FTA, but only provided there was no successful 
challenge that the FTA did not meet GATT Article XXIV’s two core requirements. 
Were the FTA’s consistency with GATT Article XXIV to be addressed and the 
Appellate Body to find that the FTA was inconsistent with either of these two GATT 
Article XXIV requirements, the Appellate Body would then decline to recognize 
provisions of the FTA as a defense to WTO rules. This approach would help to discipline 
FTAs, and encourage FTA members to negotiate agreements that are consistent with 
GATT Article XXIV. Nonetheless, this approach runs the risk that the political and judicial 
stresses of actually verifying the consistency of FTAs with GATT Article XXIV – a task 
that the GATT and the WTO have studiously avoided – would worsen the current political 
stalemate in the WTO.  
 
2. Three Political Options. If the Appellate Body’s dicta in Peru-Additional Duty 
effectively eliminates the ability of WTO Members to raise FTA defenses, then WTO 
Members can turn to political options that range in their ambition. First, in complement 
with the first judicial option, individual WTO Members could write into their FTAs clear 
and express waivers of their rights to bring a WTO complaint in relation to specific 
measures (such as Peru’s PRS). The Appellate Body already has recognized that it must 
interpret other international treaties, whether in the context of waivers, interpreting WTO 
obligations, or interpreting WTO provisions that incorporate other international treaties 
(Pauwelyn 2016).  
Second, if the Appellate Body does not change its position, a more ambitious 
solution would be for the WTO membership to create a protocol confirming that WTO 
panels and the WTO Appellate Body are authorized to raise FTA provisions as defenses to 
WTO claims, so long as the defense does not prejudice the rights or obligations of any 
WTO Member that is not a party to the FTA. Such confirmation signals to the Appellate 
Body that WTO provisions for amendments of the WTO agreements (applying to all WTO 
Members) do not supersede Article 41 of the Vienna Convention concerning inter se 
modifications of rights and obligations as a defense to a WTO complaint. 
Third, a much more ambitious approach would be to transform the WTO dispute 
settlement system into a system of general jurisdiction for all trade agreements that contain 
a compromissory clause recognizing its jurisdiction, and that provide adequate funding to 
support any necessary expansion of the WTO secretariat, panels, and Appellate Body 
(Trebilcock 2015). The WTO already hires additional secretariat members for particular 
cases (the Boeing (U.S.)-Airbus (E.U.) cases being a notorious example) and panelists are 
funded on an ad hoc basis. Such adaptation is easily conceivable, although the membership 
of the Appellate Body may need to be expanded slightly.  
Under this scenario, the WTO dispute settlement system would be able to hear 
complaints, as well as defenses, under FTAs. New issues would of course arise based on 
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the FTA’s updating and clarification of trade rules. That is not a problem, however, because 
it is what the WTO as a negotiating forum was supposed to do. Since the Doha Round of 
trade negotiations has collapsed, and since the political process for updating and clarifying 
rules has migrated to FTAs, this approach contends that the WTO dispute settlement 
mechanism should be adapted. Otherwise the WTO judicial process and the FTA political 
process will be in tension, imbalanced, and incoherent. Such a more pluralist approach to 
trade negotiations, moreover, could have the advantage that it facilitates the ability of 
sovereign countries to tailor rules to their differing contexts in a diverse world. The WTO 
institution would, under this scenario, remain critical in keeping FTAs under multilateral 
surveillance so as to ensure greater trust and potentially facilitate their inclusivity over time, 
possibly leading to the amendment of WTO rules for the entire membership. 
It is unlikely that WTO Members can reach agreement over either of the last two 
political options, given the difficulty of reaching consensus among over 160 WTO 
Members. Thus, pressure will increase on the Appellate Body to interpret WTO rules for 
today’s changed landscape, and to find ways to accept defenses under WTO-consistent 
FTAs. As trade agreements proliferate and possibly extend to mega-regionals such as the 
TPP, the WTO needs to stay relevant. One way is by contributing to the systemic 
integration of politically negotiated trade outcomes through the WTO judicial mechanism. 
In its very first case, US-Reformulated Gasoline (1996, p. 17), the Appellate Body wrote 
that WTO rules should not be read “in clinical isolation from public international law.” The 
WTO Appellate Body has integrated public international law concerns over the 
environment and public health through its interpretation of the open-ended language of 
GATT Article XX. The new challenge for the Appellate Body is how to address the 
sprawling world of FTAs in WTO jurisprudence. 
 
Conclusion  
Peru-Additional Duty raises the question of how a WTO dispute settlement panel 
and the Appellate Body should respond when a party accepts a measure in an FTA and 
then brings a complaint that the measure violates WTO rules. It is not an isolated issue. 
Studies show that significant numbers of FTAs contain provisions that appear to cut back 
on WTO liberalization requirements as applied among FTA Members, such as regarding 
export restrictions (Zhang 2016). 
Peru bound its tariffs for the four categories of agricultural products in question at 
68%. It then lowered its applied tariff rate to 0%, but subject to a Price Range System 
where tariffs can increase on a fortnightly basis (although no more than the binding) if the 
international market price is less than the monthly average price over the previous five 
years. In parallel, Peru signed a series of FTAs where the contracting parties arguably 
consent to its use of the PRS. The Appellate Body, however, following its earlier 
jurisprudence in Chile-Price Band, held that the PRS was effectively a variable import levy 
and likely a minimum import price in violation of Article 4.2 of the WTO Agreement on 
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Agriculture.  
A critical question, nonetheless, remained: whether the Peru-Guatemala FTA, 
which provides that Peru “may maintain” the PRS, could be used as a defense. The panel 
avoided the issue by noting that Peru had not ratified the FTA. The Appellate Body, in 
contrast, went beyond this reasoning and suggested that FTA rules cannot be used as a 
defense. Such a suggestion has significant systemic implications, especially given global 
political developments and the proliferation of FTAs. It might appear presumptuous for a 
WTO tribunal to find that WTO rules forever trump FTA rules regarding Members’ policy 
space, even when the FTA complies with WTO requirements, and the FTA rules are later 
in time, directly on point, respond to dissatisfaction with an earlier Appellate Body ruling, 
do not adversely affect other WTO Members, and public international law provides rules 
that enable a panel to avoid an outcome that would violate the parties’ clear intent. An 
ongoing challenge for the WTO and its Members is how the WTO dispute settlement 
system engages with FTAs. The saga continues. 
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